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The aim of this article is to analyse the impact of health care insurance coverage beyond the National
Health System (NHS) on the consumption of doctor visits. Approximately a quarter of the Portuguese
population has a second (or more) layer of health insurance coverage on top of the NHS, through em-
ployer-provided and voluntary health schemes. The focus will be on the double coverage resulting
from employer provided health subsystems, regarding both insurance plans provided to public em-
ployees and insurance plans of big companies. Unlike previous studies that estimate average effects,
in this article the impact is assessedat different levelsof the outcome distribution.Results indicatethat
the effect of double coverage on the utilisation of health care is especially high in the private subsys-
tems. An interesting finding is that these effects are similar in all outcome distribution, being only
slightly lower in the upper tail, showing that double coverage provided by the Portuguese subsystems
is a relevant issue in all levels of usage.
The study of double coverage effects is particularly relevant in the context of public subsystems in the
Portuguese health sector. Indeed, it was expected that the creation of a public health system in 1979
would prompt the integration of public employees’ plans into the NHS, which in fact did not happen.
The non-integration of these subsystems raised some equity issues as the NHS provides a less com-
prehensive health protection plan than those available under public health schemes, which ensure to
their beneficiaries a higher level of access to health care services at lowercosts (Lourenço (2007) and
Pereira (1995)). Moreover, in the context of an upward trend of the ratio of health care spending to
GDP, policy makers are increasingly concerned with the incentives resulting from different kinds of
health protection plans. In this regard, this work produces some empirical evidence on the effects on
the consumption of health care services derived from the supplementary health insurance provided to
public employees. Further, the impact of public health subsystems is compared with that of insurance
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The literature on health economics has been investigating the impact of additional health coverage in
several countries (for example Cameron et al. (1988) for Australia, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) for
Germany and Vera-Hernández (1999) for Spain), usually finding a positive relation between double
coverage and health care use. Also, some authors (Lourenço (2007) and Barros el al. (2008)) already
focused their research on the impact of supplementary insurance provided by Portuguese health sub-
systems. According to the results the population covered by additional health insurance has a higher
consumption of health care services.
As mentioned before, the most distinctive feature of this study vis-à-vis previous empirical research is
the usageof a quantileregressionfor counts methodology, recentlyproposedbyMachadoand Santos
Silva (2005). Existing literature addressing health insurance double coverage focus on mean effects.
In contrast, by looking at other points of the conditional distribution, the study unveils the effect over all
the utilisation distribution. This is a step forward in the analysis of reforms and is particularly useful for
policy making purposes (e.g. clarifyingwhetherthe policy effect is larger for lowor high users, identify-
ing the need for adjustments in key features of the subsystems).
Datawastakenfrom thePortugueseHealthSurveyof 2005/2006,acrosssectionalhealthdatasetthat
provides a wide range of information at an individual level concerning socioeconomic conditions and
health status indicators. After defining the population of interest (and the respective sample), observa-
tions were divided according to the type of health care coverage, being chosen three mutually exclu-
sive groups: only the NHS, the NHS plus a public subsystem and the NHS plus a private subsystem.
The usage of non-experimental data generallycreates an endogeneityproblem related to adverse se-
lectionsinceinmost casesthe decisionto buyextrahealthinsurancedependsonindividualcharacter-
istics. The solution may rely on a careful use of instrumental variables. Having in mind this problem,
individuals withvoluntary health insurance schemes wereexcludedfrom the selected population. This
issue was not very relevant in the public and private subsystems since membership was compulsory
and based on occupation or professional category, and as such it should be unrelated to the expected
value of future health care utilisation (unless we consider issues related with occupational choice).
This work has some caveats, shared by most literature on the impact of additional health coverage. In
particular, even without directly facing the adverse selection problem, the usage of observational data
to estimate causal effects creates several difficulties (especially because the evaluation is made
through dummy variables in a regression).
1 Moreover, the economic interpretation can be dubious.
First of all, we could not disentangle demand and supply effects, as it is only possible to measure the
overall impact trough the utilisation level. Additionally, although the impact of double coverage is often
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(1) In the present work this partially results from the unavailability of panel data that would allow comparing outcome before and after the benefit of
supplementary health insurance.associated with moral hazard behaviour,
2 some authors criticize such direct association, arguing with
the existence of other important effects. For instance, Vera-Hernández (1999) refers the impact of in-
surance on individuals’ health, which will decrease the future consumption of health care. Also
Coulson et al. (1995) point to the importance of supply-inducement by providers, in explaining how
difficult it is to measure a “pure” moral hazard effect.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes key features of the Portuguese health care
system. Section 3 describes the dataset and the relevant variables, and presents a preliminary analy-
sis of data. In Section 4 the quantile regression for counts and a discussion of the empirical specifica-
tion are briefly presented. Section 5 analyses the results and studies the effect of double coverage for
different age groups. Section 6 makes some final remarks.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
The Portuguese health system is a network of public and private health care providers and different
funding schemes. It is possible to identify three overlapping layers: the NHS
3, employer provided pub-
lic and private subsystems and private voluntary health insurance. While the NHS is mainly financed
by general taxation, subsystems resources come from employees and employers compulsory contri-
butions (including, in the public schemes, State funds to ensure their balance). According to Barros
and Simões (2007), in 2004 public funding represented 71.2 per cent of total health expenditure (of
which 57.6 per cent is related with the NHS and 7.0 per cent with subsidies to public subsystems). Pri-
vate expenditure is composed by co-payments and direct payments made by patients and, to a lesser
extent, by private insurance premiums.
In 1979, with the creation of the NHS, legislation established that all residents have the right to health
protection regardless of economic or social status. Until then, the State had full responsibility only for
the health care of public employees and some specific health services, such as maternity, child and
mental care and the control of infectious diseases. After the outset of the statutory public system, the
health subsystems were not integrated into the NHS and continued to cover a variety of public and
private employees.
The individualscovered solelyby the NHS (the majorityof the population)face some constraints in the
access to health care, in particular because several services are in practice excluded from the public
network and access is difficult sometimes due to time costs (long waiting lists and queuing) and geo-
graphical barriers. Lourenço (2007) among others, argues that the NHS coverage restrictions convert
its normative completeness into an incomplete health insurance contract. The NHS is designed in a
way that beneficiaries should first seek health care through their general practitioner (family doctor) in
health care centres and then, if necessary, get appropriate referrals to a public specialist consultation
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the income of the insured, and the opportunity cost of time in the case of illness.
(3) Intheautonomousregions,publichealthisensuredbyregionalhealthservices(RHSofAzoresandMadeira),followingthesameprinciplesoftheNHS,but
implemented by regional governments. Here it is not useful to treat them separately.(generallyasout-patientconsultationsinpublichospitals).This gatekeeperprocedureisnotstrictlyfol-
lowed as there are households who do not have access to a family doctor and, when they have, the
time lag betweenthe first step to obtain health care and its actual provisionis frequentlytoo long. Addi-
tionally, the requirements to obtain referrals are sometimes too demanding. For these reasons, some
individualshavetheirfirst contactwithhealthcareinhospitals’emergencyroomseveniftheircondition
wouldnotrequireit. Giventheseconstraints, theconsumptionof privateservicesbyNHSbeneficiaries
is very common. The NHS design contemplates a cost-share mechanism that in practice makes the
patients pay a mandatory small co-payment to the public provider (variable with the type of service),
usually on a fee-for-service basis. There are, however, exemptions for a large share of the population,
defined on the basis of age and income. When using health services provided by the private sector,
NHS beneficiaries, in the absence of private voluntary insurance schemes, bear their full cost, without
being reimbursed afterwards (although part of out-of-pocket expenditure may be recovered through a
tax credit).
Nowadays,a considerable share of the population (between16 and 25 per cent, according to different
estimations)stillbenefits from employerprovidedhealthinsurancethroughseveralsubsystems,either
private or public. Among the double coverage schemes, the largest public subsystem is ADSE
(Direcção-Geral de Protecção Social aos Funcionários e Agentes da AdministraçãoPública), a health
insurance provider that covers most public employees and their dependants (about 13 per cent of the
population).Specific schemes exist for examplefor armed forces personnel. Private subsystemswere
created for workers and pensioners (and their dependants) of specific companies, like SAMS
(Serviços de Assistência Médico-Social) for banking employees. Each subsystem has a distinct array
of medical care insurance arrangements to finance and provide health care. As a whole,it can be said
that theyareorganizeddifferentlyfrom the NHS, inparticularbecauseof the narrowerscopeof directly
provided services. They basically make available health care through contracts with public/NHS and
private institutions and reimburse patients costs for services supplied by private entities without con-
tract. These features make these schemes more comprehensive health protection plans than NHS,
representing both complementary and supplementary types of insurance (Lourenço (2007)). The sup-
plementaryprotectionresultsfromtheprovision/financingofservicesthatarealsoavailableinthecon-
text of the NHS. The complementarity characteristic is related to the fact that subsystems cover
services almost not provided by the NHS, in particular, by reimbursing part of patient’s payments to
private providers.
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Data was taken from the fourth Portuguese Health Survey (PHS), a cross sectional health dataset de-
signed to be representative of the Portuguese household population.
4 The survey provides a wide
rangeof informationat an individuallevel,namelydemographicandsocioeconomicconditions,typeof
health insurance, health-care utilization, health status indicators (like chronic diseases and long run
and short run disability),lifestyles(like eating habits and sports activity)and costs withhealth services.
The PHS wascollected through interviewscarried out betweenFebruary2005 and January2006. The
sample used in this paper comprises 35,308 observationsand wasobtained after definingthe relevant
populationand handlingof the data (namely, byconsideringonlycomplete observations). In particular,
the population was restricted to individuals without voluntary private health insurance and with less
than 80 years old.
5
In order to explain the impact of double coverage on the consumption of doctor visits and taking into
account the raw data of the survey, the dependent variable (y) was defined as the “total number of vis-
its to doctorsinthethreemonthspriorto theinterview”.Regardingtheregressors,Table1presents the
covariates used in the analysis clustered into groups encompassing health insurance status, socio-
economic characteristics, health status and, additional ones designed to control for geographic and
seasonal effects. The selection was made according to their influence on medical care consumption,
takingintoaccountthe Grossman’s healthcapital modelof demandfor health(1972),as wellas the re-
sultsofsimilarempiricalstudies(Cameronetal.(1988),PohlmeierandUlrich(1995),Vera-Hernández
(1999),DebandTrivedi(2002)andLourenço(2007)).It isnotstraightforwardtounderstandtheutilisa-
tion of health care since it results from both patients and doctors decisions. It is possible, however, to
find several channels through which the selected variables affect the number of doctor visits.
3.1. Double coverage variables
To account for differences in health insurance coverage, three mutually exclusive groups of observa-
tions were considered, namely the “NHS” composed by individuals with only the “default” health sys-
tem and two double coverage types, the “Public subsystems” for people with NHS plus a public
subsystemandthe“Privatesubsystems”forindividualswithNHSandaprivatesubsystem.The major-
ity of observations are from the NHS group (81.5 per cent), followed by the public subsystems (15.8
per cent), and only 2.7 per cent have private subsystems. Insurance can be interpreted as a price
proxy, being the differences between health systems as regards costs to beneficiaries (as co-pay-
ments and non-reimbursements) a direct price, and those related to delivery systems and mecha-
nismstocontrolforitsuseanindirectcostofaccess.WhencomparedtotheNHS,subsystemsprovide
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Health insurance status variables
pubsub =1 if the individual is covered by a public subsystem
privsub =1 if the individual is covered by a private subsystem
Health status variables
sick =1 if the individual is being sick
limitdays number of days with temporary (not long run) incapacity
limited =1 if the individual is limited/handicapped
rheumatism =1 if the individual has rheumatism
osteoporosis =1 if the individual has osteoporosis
cancer =1 if the individual has cancer
kidneystones =1 if the individual has kidneystones
renalfailure =1 if the individual has renalfailure
emphysema =1 if the individual has emphysema
cerebralhemorrhage =1 if the individual had a cerebral hemorrhage
infarction =1 if the individual had an infarction
depressivedisorder =1 if the individual has a depressive disorder
otherchronicaldisease =1 if the individual has another chronical disease
highbloodpressure =1 if the individual has high blood pressure
chronicpain =1 if the individual has a chronic pain
diabetes =1 if the individual has diabetes
asthma =1 if the individual has asthma
stress =1 if the individual has been taking sleeping pills or anxiety pills in the last two weeks
smoker =1 if the individual smokes daily
meals =1 if the individual makes at least three meals a day
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize household size of the individual
age age in years
female =1 if the individual is female
educmax number of years of schooling completed with success of the most educated person living in the household
lincome logarithm of equivalent monthly income in euros
single =1 if the individual is single and do not cohabits
student =1 if the individual is student or has it fist job or has a not remunerated job
retired =1 if the individual is retired
Geographic variables
Norte =1 if the individual lives in the region “Norte”
Lisboa =1 if the individual lives in the region “Lisboa”
Alentejo =1 if the individual lives in the region “Alentejo”
Algarve =1 if the individual lives in the region “Algarve”
Açores =1 if the individual lives in the region “Açores”
Madeira =1 if the individual lives in the region “Madeira”
Seasonal variables
winter =1 if the interview took place in winter
spring =1 if the interview took place in spring
summer =1 if the interview took place in summermore benefits to their beneficiariesbydecreasingthe price-per-servicefaced bypatients, whichwhen-
ever demand is elastic, increases their demand for health care (Barros et al. (2008)).
As mentioned in the introduction, the estimation of the double coverage effect may be biased if the re-
searcher ignores adverse selection in the decision to obtain additional insurance. In such case, it cre-
ates an endogeneity problem that results in an overestimation of the impact of the supplementary
insurance variables. Previous studies using data for Portugal assumed that the particular features of
the Portuguese subsystems make them exogenous, i.e. not correlated with the beneficiaries’ health
status(e.g.Barrosetal. (2008)andLourenço(2007)).This happensbecauseit isveryimplausiblethat
individuals want to work as public employees or in companies with private subsystems just to benefit
from this additional health insurance, especially if one takes into account that, by default, people are
covered bya health care system(NHS). Moreover, it is also unlikelythat employerschoose individuals
on the basis of unobservablevariablesrelatedto their healthor their householdhealthstatus. The only
requirement is that the potential employee is suitable for the job and has no infectious disease which
could be controlled through our set of pre-determined variables. Nevertheless, Jones et al. (2006a)
analysed the effect of supplementary insurance on the probability of visiting a specialist doctor, allow-
ing for potential endogeneity of the insurance variable and, for Portugal, they conclude that the
increased probability of utilisation is not due to adverse selection effects.
Additionally,insurancecovariatescancapturetwoeffectsthatunderestimatetheimpactofdoublecov-
erage. Firstly, the fact that the subsystemsbeneficiariesenjoymore or better treatment than NHS ben-
eficiaries may decrease the future consumption of health care (Vera-Hernández (1999) and Barros et
al.(2008)).This isbecauseoverlifetime,betterhealthcarewouldtranslateintoasignificantaccumula-
tion of health advantages not totally captured in the other controlled variables. This issue will be ad-
dressed in Section 6, by restricting the analysis to young beneficiaries who did not yet had time to
accumulate such advantages and compare the results withthose of the larger sample. Finally, another
important comment on the doublecoveragecoefficients is that theydo not reflect an impact of demand
and/orsupplyandassuchtheycannotbetotallyassociatedwithmoralhazardbehaviourbutinsteadto
a joint effect of beneficiaries’ moral hazard and providers supply-inducement of demand. The latter is
related to the fact that doctors mayprescribe more tests in the case of patients withhealth subsystems
in order to justify more visits. According to Barros et al. (2008), the payments to subsystems providers
are relativelylow, and as such the magnitudeof this effect should be verysmall. Anyway, the important
point here is to capture how much the system design increases the consumption of resources related
to doctor visits, as it is difficult to make a direct association to demand/supplyimpacts or moral hazard
effects.
3.2. Other health care consumption covariates
One of the most crucial influences on health care consumption that is important to control for concerns
the health status of the interviewed. In the PHS, this feature is only indirectly captured through some
questionsthat reflect details about current healthconditions(e.g. sickness episodesand temporaryin-
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tionally, the consumption of barbiturates as a proxy to the level of exposure to stress, as well as some
other regressors related to attitudes with a potential impact on health, like the number of meals and a
dummy variable identifying smokers/non-smokers also play a role. Despite being crude measures,
these last covariates allow to capture some remaining health aspects and some unobserved
influences.
Among the variablesrepresentingdemographicand socioeconomiccharacteristicsof the interviewed,
age is particularly important. According to Grossman (1972), age captures the depreciation of health
capitalthatisexpectedtoincreaseastheindividualgetsolder,atleastaftersomepointofthelifecycle,
making the healthy times decrease and expanding the demand for health care over the life span. Re-
garding the effect of gender, it is believed that health depends both on biological differences between
men and women through innate features, and differences in life styles and attitudes towards health
risk.
6 Additionally, it is also relevant to control for the marital status. Besides arguments of different life
styles and attitudes towards risk, it is likely that some decisions when taken by more than one person
benefit from more information and advice, which influence health status and efficiency in producing
healthytimes. To control for the educational level, a variable wasdefined withthe number of schooling
years of the most educated person living in the household.
7 It is expected that more educated people
aremoreefficient, andas such,evenif theyaimat a betterhealthstatustheyneedrelativelylessmedi-
calcare(Jonesetal. (2006b)).Further, differenteducationallevelsareassociatedwithdifferentprefer-
ences. The variables student and retired capture occupational status which may explain some
differences in the depreciationrate. Another important variable includedin the model is monthlyequiv-
alent income.
8 Indeed, there are several reasons to believe that medical utilisation increases with
income, as it is a proxy of ability to pay.
The variables that represent the region of residence were included to control for possible behavioural
differences in the demand and supply of health care services. The main reason to include them is be-
cause they proxy different access condition to medical care supply, since some regional services are
differentlyorganized.Moreover, the regionsencompass wideareas but nevertheless,whencompared
in terms of wealthor educationalindicators, huge differences are obtained, whichcould justifydifferent
attitudes regarding the use of health care services (not totally captured at the individual level). Finally,
becauseit is likelythat individuals’healthstatus mayhavesome seasonaldifferences, the analysiswill
include dummy variables to control for the period of the year in which the interview took place.
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(6) Age is introduced in the regression through a nonlinear relationship and the analysis is developed with a specification that allows the assessment of the
ageing effect by gender.
(7) This particular indicator was chosen, as an alternative to the usual number of schooling years of each individual, because it is believed that the decision
about the number of visits to a doctor is at least partially a decision of the household.
(8) In the PHS, income is only compiled for the household as a whole through a categorical ordinal variable with ten thresholds that indicate intervals of net
disposablehouseholdincomeinthemonthpriortotheinterview(includingwages,pensions,andallsortsofsocialsecuritybenefits).Acommonprocedure
tocontrolforincomeeffectsisincludinginthemodelasetofdummyvariables,oneforeachcategory.Here,suchalternativeisnotveryattractiveduetothe
fact that it would be impossible to take into account the composition of households. As such, it was chosen a more flexible and parsimonious modelling
strategy(althoughnotproblem-free)withtheconstructionamonthlyincomevariablethat,inafirststageassignsanincomecorrespondingtothemidpointof
the interval, and in a second stage the midpoint is divided by the square root of household size.3.3. Preliminary analysis of the data
Apreliminaryanalysisoftheempiricaldistributionofthedependentvariable(y), showsthatitisacount
variable (non-negative integer valued count y= 0, 1, 2, …) with a large proportion of zeros (half of the
sample) as well as a long right tail of individuals who make heavy use of health care (Chart 1). These
features make the estimation particularly difficult since it will be necessary to use flexible models that
accommodate them. For the wholesample, the average number of consultations is 1.01 and the aver-
age number of visits for those that have at least one visit is 2.04. Moreover, the unconditional variance
ismorethanthreetimestheunconditionalmean.Whentheaveragenumberofvisitstoadoctorisana-
lysed by health insurance schemes, it is possible to observe that private subsystems beneficiaries are
higher users than NHS and public subsystems groups. Indeed, a mean comparison t-test indicates
that the unconditional mean does not differ across NHS and public subsystems but differ when one
compares NHS with private subsystems.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables by health insurance type. The
mean comparison t-test indicates that most of the differences between the three types are significant,
especially regarding socioeconomic pre-determined variables. The NHS group has relatively less
years of education and lowerincome. On its turn, public subsystems beneficiaries are younger(on av-
erage about 4 yearsless than the other groups), have a greater proportion of students and singles and
a smaller share of retired persons. The private subsystems group has less women and a smaller
householdsize. As regardsthe healthstatus distributionsof the three groups, it is possibleto conclude
that the major differences are found between the public subsystem and the NHS. Public employees
seem to be the healthier, in particular when some variables related to physical limitations (limiteddays
and limited) and the presence of chronic disease and pain are considered. Moreover, frequent health
problems (e.g. high blood pressure, diabetes and stress) are relatively more common in the NHS and
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Chart 1
EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF







0123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5






















Source: PHS 2005/2006 and authors’ calculations.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
Autumn 2009 | Articles
200
Table 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
NHS Public subsystem Private subsystem
mean st.dev mean st.dev p-value mean st.dev p-value
Health status variables
sick 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.363
limitdays 0.613 0.015 0.488 0.030 0.000 0.536 0.077 0.327
limited 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.000
rheumatism 0.168 0.002 0.120 0.004 0.000 0.134 0.011 0.003
osteoporosis 0.069 0.001 0.060 0.003 0.014 0.068 0.008 0.943
cancer 0.019 0.001 0.020 0.002 0.688 0.022 0.005 0.491
kidneystones 0.048 0.001 0.051 0.003 0.473 0.058 0.008 0.224
renalfailure 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.196 0.014 0.004 0.971
emphysema 0.034 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.005 0.015
cerebralhaemorrhage 0.018 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.020 0.005 0.654
infarction 0.014 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.103 0.014 0.004 0.956
depressivedisorder 0.074 0.002 0.074 0.004 0.934 0.082 0.009 0.395
otherchronicaldisease 0.319 0.003 0.297 0.006 0.001 0.317 0.015 0.928
highbloodpressure 0.221 0.002 0.178 0.005 0.000 0.222 0.013 0.977
chronicpain 0.148 0.002 0.110 0.004 0.000 0.119 0.010 0.006
diabetes 0.077 0.002 0.054 0.003 0.000 0.074 0.008 0.651
asthma 0.051 0.001 0.057 0.003 0.075 0.049 0.007 0.837
stress 0.119 0.002 0.104 0.004 0.001 0.124 0.011 0.631
smoker 0.162 0.002 0.138 0.005 0.000 0.179 0.012 0.200
meals 0.926 0.002 0.949 0.003 0.000 0.933 0.008 0.402
Socioeconomic and demographic variables
householdsize 3.387 0.009 3.342 0.017 0.020 3.100 0.037 0.000
age 42.044 0.131 38.984 0.285 0.000 42.946 0.685 0.196
female 0.515 0.003 0.537 0.007 0.003 0.419 0.016 0.000
educmax 8.112 0.026 11.949 0.061 0.000 11.625 0.147 0.000
lincome 6.048 0.003 6.624 0.007 0.000 6.669 0.019 0.000
single 0.350 0.003 0.391 0.007 0.000 0.322 0.015 0.076
student 0.164 0.002 0.247 0.006 0.000 0.188 0.013 0.065
retired 0.185 0.002 0.171 0.005 0.012 0.256 0.014 0.000
Geographic variables
Norte 0.161 0.002 0.093 0.004 0.000 0.104 0.010 0.000
Lisboa 0.126 0.002 0.146 0.005 0.000 0.232 0.014 0.000
Alentejo 0.136 0.002 0.166 0.005 0.000 0.120 0.011 0.133
Algarve 0.146 0.002 0.122 0.004 0.000 0.181 0.012 0.006
Açores 0.147 0.002 0.205 0.005 0.000 0.169 0.012 0.079
Madeira 0.139 0.002 0.147 0.005 0.127 0.060 0.008 0.000
Seasonality variables
winter 0.255 0.003 0.254 0.006 0.873 0.314 0.015 0.000
spring 0.258 0.003 0.255 0.006 0.702 0.235 0.014 0.110
summer 0.249 0.003 0.237 0.006 0.052 0.246 0.014 0.825
Sources: PHS 2005/2006 and authors’ calculations.
Note: The p-value results of a two-sample mean-comparison test (unpaired) and indicates if the probability of the mean of each variable does not significantly differ across insurance
types. For the comparison between the NHS and the public subsystem it was considered H0: NHS Public subsystem  ; and for the comparison between the NHS and the private sub-
system it was considered H0:  NHS Private subsystem  .private subsystem groups. This feature can be partially related with age, which is lower among the
public subsystems group. Additionally, it is worth highlighting that public employees seem to be less
exposedto stress and that the indicatorsrelated to attitudes showa smaller proportionof smokers and
a higher average number of meals. The regional distribution of the groups is also unequal in the full
sample. These sample differences suggest that a more complete account for them is required, so that
an appropriate comparison of health care demand across groups can be made.
4. METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
As in most of the empirical research on health care economics, the dependent variable here consid-
ered is a non-negative integer count characterized by a large proportion of zeros, a positive skewness
and, as a consequence, a long right hand tail. In what concerns econometric tools, until recently, the
one-part, Hurdle and finite mixture models have dominated the empirical literature (Deb and Trivedi
(2002)). Estimators resulting from these frameworks rely on assumptions about the functional form of
the regression equation and the distribution of the error term. As a result, standard models determine
entirely the distributional behaviour by the functional form once the conditional mean response is
known. An attractive alternative is the usage of nonparametric and semiparametric estimators. Intro-
duced for continuous data in Koenker and Bassett (1978), Quantile Regression offers a complete pic-
ture of the effect of the covariates on the location, scale and shape of the distribution of the dependent
variable.As a semiparametricmethodit assumesa parametricspecificationfor thequantileof thecon-
ditional distribution but leaves the error term unspecified. It was first applied to continuous health data
in Manning (1995). Recently, Machado and Santos Silva (2005) succeeded in applying the quantile
framework to count data through a “jittering” process that artificially imposes some degree of
smoothness.
The basic idea was to build a continuous auxiliary variable (y*) whose quantiles have a one-to-one
knownrelationshipwiththe quantilesof the count variableof interest (y). This variablecan be obtained
byaddingto the count variablea uniform random variable,independentof the dependent(y) and inde-
pendentvariables(x).
9 Followingthe Machadoand Santos Silva (2005) suggestionappliedto the spe-
cific object of this study, the parametric representation of the-quantile of y* is defined as:
       Q x pubsub privsub z yi i i i * |e x p ,             	 01 2 01
where pubsubi and privsubi represent individuals from the “public subsystem” and “private subsys-
tem”, respectively. The vectorzi includesallothercharacteristicsthat werecontrolledfor inthis regres-
sion.
10 In order to applythe standard quantile regression, a monotonic transformation of y * is created,
ensuring that the estimated quantiles are non-negative and linear in the parameters of a vector of
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(9) The one-to-onerelationshipis guaranteedsinceMachadoandSantos-Silva(2005)showedthat marginaleffects of y * are easilyobtainedandinterpreted
and that there is a correspondence betweeny* and y quantile functions:   
 Qx Q x yi y i  || *  1 
 where a is a ceiling function. 10101010101111109999 9
(10) In additionto all independentvariablesreferred in Section 3, it is used a third order polynomialin age and a third order polynomialin age crossed with the
gender variable.regressors.
11 Then, the vector of covariates            012 ,,,is obtained as a solution
to a standard quantile regression of a linear transformed variable by minimizing an asymmetrically
weighted sum of absolute errors. Machado and Santos Silva (2005) proved that although the quantile
regression is not differentiable everywhere,the estimator is consistent and asymptoticallynormal. Be-
cause “noise” has been artificially created for technical reasons, the authors suggested a Monte Carlo
procedure - an “average-jittering”- whichconsists in obtaining an estimator that is the average of m in-
dependent “jittering” samples with the same size. The difference between samples is the continuous
auxiliary variable because it was created as the sum of y (constant between samples) withm different
draws of the uniform distribution. The main advantage of this procedure is that the resulting estimator
is more efficient than the one obtained from a single draw and a misspecification-robust estimator of
the covariance matrix is available.
Following this procedure, a direct interpretation of   may suggest some misleading conclusions.
Note that  is a vector of linear partial effects on the linear transformation of y*. To fully understand
theimpacts, theanalysisshouldbemadethrough  Qx yi * |  , whichisnotsoeasilyinterpretedduetoits
non-linearityas wellas to the fact that it is a functionof-quantile.Beingnon-linear, the parameterpro-
videsanincompletepictureof the covariates’effects onthe shapeof the distribution.Andbeinga func-
tion of  implies, for example, that a variable with the same estimated coefficient in all quantiles will
have a proportional effect that varies with-quantile. To take into account the non-linearity, partial ef-
fects can be computed setting the continuous (and count) variables at the mean of the sample and the
dummy variables equal to zero ~ x .
12 To facilitate the comparison of the effects across the different
models, the semi-elasticities of  Qx y * |  with respect to the covariates are presented. Regarding the
statistical significance on the variable of interest (y), it is possible to test the null hypothesis that a
covariate has no effect on  Qx y | because it is equivalent to test whether the variable has no impact
on  Qx y * |  . The problem appears whenthe variable is significant in quantiles of the auxiliaryvariable.
In such case it could be non significant in the conditional quantile of y. This occurs because different
quantiles of y* correspond to the same quantiles of y. The question here is that when it is found that
 Qx y * |  depends on the covariate for several quantiles, then it should be possible to detect a
subpopulation for which the semi-elasticity of  Qx y | is different from zero. Machado and Santos
Silva (2005) call this “magnifying glass effect” of  Qx y * |  .
5. RESULTS
The results were obtained from the qcount package of STATA (Miranda (2006)) with some slight ad-
justments. Regarding the number of jittered samples, preliminary experiments showed that the coeffi-
cients are not very sensitive to a particular sample of uniform random variables used to jitter the data:
with 1500 samples almost no changes were detected both in the coefficients and standard deviations.
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(11) This is feasible because quantiles are equivariant to monotonic transformations and to censoring from below up to the quantile of interest.
(12) More specifically, the “default individual” is a healthy non-smoker man that does not consume barbiturates but makes less than three meals a day.
Regardingits socioeconomicand demographicsituation, he is neither single nor retired and belongs to an average householdsize, educationallevel and
income. Moreover, he lives in the region“Centro”and was interviewedin autumn. Also note that, the vector ~ x is set with the dummies pubsuband privsub
equal to zero, and thus the “default individual” has the NHS insurance plan. 131313131314141312121212 12The decision on whichquantiles to compute took into account the problem under analysisand the em-
pirical distribution of the relevant outcome. Since the marginal quantiles are zero for all0.50, it be-
comes more interesting to compute conditional quantiles on the upper tail of the distribution where the
effect of covariateschangesrapidly. Note that in the lowertail, a variationin the conditionalquantilesof
the artificial outcome may be mostly due to the random noise that wasadded. Therefore, it is expected
to find quantiles more flat. Moreover, it is more interesting to look at the behaviour of individuals who
make heavy use of health care. In this scenario, and despite the fact that the first quartile is still pre-
sented, this work focus on quantiles above the median, computing results for each decile above the
median.
Table 3 presents the semi-elasticities estimates of the quantiles regressions according to the proce-
dure defined in the previous section. In what concerns statistical significance (standard errors are pre-
sented in Moreira and Barros (2009)), variables are overall significant. The signs of the regressors do
not switch across the different quantiles.
Starting with the analysis of insurance variables, it is visible that both public and private subsystems
have an increasing positive effect on the number of doctor visits until the 7th decile of y* and a de-
creasing positive effect thereafter, being the effect of private insurance plans between 2.6 and 2.9
times higher than the impact of those of public employees.
13 An interesting fact is the similarity be-
tweenthe patterns of both subsystemssince, whenthe ratio betweenthe doublecoveragedummies is
computed across quantiles, it remains almost unchanged. This finding indicates that supplementary
health insurance does lead to further utilisation of health care (visits) and its origin is also quite impor-
tant, as private subsystemsdouble coverage induces more consumption than public subsystemsdou-
ble coverage. In order to better understand the effect of health subsystems on the utilisation of health
care, point estimates were used to predict the y-quantile for each observation in a simulation exercise
in which all variables are set equal to their actual values, except health insurance status. Regarding
this one, three possibilities are considered: NHS, public subsystem or private subsystem. The results
measured by relative frequencies are presented in Table 4. Given that half of the sample has zero vis-
its, it isnotsurprisingthat thefirst conditionalquartileiszerofor almostallobservations.Whentheesti-
mates from different quantiles are compared, it becomes clear that the distribution changes are
different across healthinsuranceplans. For example,the proportionof individualswitha predictedy of
zerooroneconsultationisalwayslowerwiththeadditionalinsurance(eitherpublicorprivate)thanwith
NHS, but these relative effects change withthe quantile. More particularly, the proportion for NHS indi-
viduals is 91.0, 70.7 and 23.4 per cent for the 50th, 75th and 90th y-quantile, respectively; while with
the “public subsystem” the proportion is 89.6, 66.4 and 19.5 per cent for the 50th, 75th and 90th
y-quantile,respectively. This means that holding double coverage causes a decreasing path in the dif-
ference of the proportion of individuals with a certain (increasing) number of visits that is steeper from
the 50th to the 75th y-quantile than from the 75th to the 90th y-quantile.
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(13) As already mentioned the direct interpretation of the coefficients has caveats, but also the semi-elasticities depend on the values assumed for the
independent variables. Besides ~ x, other vectors are also analysed. The main messages do not change significantly. 141414141415151413131313 13Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
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Table 3
QUANTILE REGRESSION FOR COUNTS RESULTS: SEMI-ELASTICITIES
~ x P25 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Health insurance status variables
pubsub 0 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.036 0.034 0.031
privsub 0 0.070 0.080 0.091 0.093 0.092 0.087
Health status variables
sick 0 0.310 0.258 0.260 0.295 0.329 0.630
limitdays 0 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.032 0.039
limited 0 0.046 0.071 0.091 0.026 0.180 0.241
rheumatism 0 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.054 0.072 0.087
osteoporosis 0 0.104 0.072 0.065 0.059 0.055 0.052
cancer 0 0.190 0.185 0.174 0.169 0.224 0.374
kidneystones 0 0.051 0.052 0.062 0.074 0.111 0.127
renalfailure 0 0.058 0.077 0.077 0.091 0.134 0.143
emphysema 0 0.030 0.073 0.081 0.091 0.118 0.146
cerebralhemorrhage 0 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.064 0.095 0.113
infarction 0 0.110 0.121 0.132 0.145 0.152 0.131
depressivedisorder 0 0.066 0.081 0.091 0.103 0.125 0.152
otherchronicaldisease 0 0.173 0.178 0.195 0.208 0.211 0.228
highbloodpressure 0 0.160 0.145 0.144 0.136 0.134 0.125
chronicpain 0 0.060 0.068 0.080 0.093 0.111 0.136
diabetes 0 0.180 0.139 0.131 0.133 0.153 0.183
asthma 0 0.107 0.120 0.131 0.145 0.143 0.140
stress 0 0.176 0.135 0.132 0.128 0.153 0.153
smoker 0 -0.059 -0.051 -0.050 -0.051 -0.041 -0.018
meals 0 0.066 0.053 0.044 0.043 0.038 0.039
Socioeconomic characteristics variables
householdsize 3.37 -0.020 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.018 -0.009
age when male * 41.58 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003
age when female * 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
female ** 0 0.155 0.151 0.169 0.209 0.179 0.179
educmax 8.81 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003
income 564.97 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
single 0 0.000 -0.056 -0.059 -0.070 -0.068 -0.059
student 0 0.000 -0.068 -0.077 -0.080 -0.074 -0.085
retired 0 0.003 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.058 0.083
Demographic variables
Norte 0 -0.016 -0.011 -0.014 -0.015 -0.024 -0.049
Lisboa 0 -0.026 -0.020 -0.025 -0.029 -0.039 -0.054
Alentejo 0 -0.076 -0.062 -0.064 -0.063 -0.065 -0.072
Algarve 0 -0.070 -0.058 -0.058 -0.055 -0.061 -0.083
Açores 0 -0.099 -0.091 -0.099 -0.114 -0.129 -0.160
Madeira 0 -0.132 -0.126 -0.139 -0.164 -0.182 -0.207
Seasonality variables
winter 0 0.059 0.059 0.063 0.067 0.066 0.085
spring 0 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.038
summer 0 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.001
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Semi-elasticities are calculated for the vector ~ x, presented in the second column. Semi-elasticities marked with * and ** were multiplied by 10 and 100, respectively. The corre-
sponding coefficients and standard errors are available upon to the authors request.Regarding the effects of health status variables as a whole, it is visible that most regressors have a
positive impact that increases with the quantile. As expected, being sick is important to determine
whetheror not the individualvisits a doctor but, taking into considerationthe results of the last decile, it
is much more important in explaining the subsequent visits. The same kind of behaviour is observed
for the effect of long term incapacity, since for the first quantiles it is not significant whereas for higher
levels of consumption it becomes a very important explanatory variable. Amongst chronic diseases
there is evidence of a positive increasing effect along the estimated quantiles, except for the dummy
osteoporosis that has a decreasing impact, while infarction, other chronic disease, high blood pres-
sure, diabetes and asthma have a constant effect over the distribution. The proxyfor the level of expo-
sure to stress has an effect that does not vary much across quantiles, and the other covariates related
to attitudes towards health care have decreasing effects. The negative impact of being a smoker con-
trasts with the results of Lourenço (2007), whichalthough using a slightly different variable found posi-
tive effects on the consumptionof visits to a doctor. These results seem to indicate that individualsthat
take better care of their health by not smoking and having a higher number of meals also complement
their care by being more pro-active in the visits to doctors, and these attitudes towards health care
more than offset the impact of the improved health (and correspondingly lower demand for doctor
visits) stemming from non-smoking and having a higher number of meals.
As a whole, the impact of variables related to socioeconomic characteristics seems similar across
quantiles. Concerning the household size effect, the results indicate that an individual consumes on
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Table 4
FREQUENCIES OF ESTIMATED QUANTILES BY HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
0123456789 10
NHS
Qy(25|x) 89.4 8.3 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Qy(50|x) 58.2 32.8 5.5 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Qy(75|x) 1.3 69.3 17.9 5.6 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.7
Qy(90|x) 0.0 23.4 46.3 15.1 6.2 3.1 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.5 1.8
Public subsystem
Qy(25|x) 87.9 9.4 1.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Qy(50|x) 54.0 35.7 6.3 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Qy(75|x) 0.7 65.7 20.1 6.5 2.9 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8
Qy(90|x) 0.0 19.5 47.2 16.6 6.7 3.5 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.6 2.0
Private subsystem
Qy(25|x) 83.6 12.3 2.4 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Qy(50|x) 46.8 40.3 7.5 2.6 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
Qy(75|x) 0.2 60.0 23.4 7.6 3.6 1.8 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.0
Qy(90|x) 0.0 13.2 47.7 19.5 7.7 4.0 2.3 1.5 1.0 0.7 2.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note:Theestimatesarebasedonasimulationexercisethatstartbypredictingthey*-quantileforall35,308 individualssettingallcontrolvariablesintheiractualvaluesexceptthehealth
insurance status, which is set at one of the three possible cases. After that, the y-quantiles are computed applyingQxQ x yi y i (|) [ (|) ] *   1 and tabulated according to their
frequencies.averageless consultationsif the numberof membersof his/herhouseholdis larger. These findingsare
in accordance with the previous parametric models and are similar to the ones found by Winkelmann
(2006). A possible economic explanation for this effect is the presence of “economies of experience”
within the family due to the fact that decisions taken by more than one person benefit from more
in-depthinformation,whichonitsturninfluencehealthstatusandefficiencyinproducinghealthytimes.
It is also plausible that scale economies play a role if it is true that when visiting a doctor patients often
also ask questionsconcerningsymptomsof diseasesof their relatives in order to prevent further visits.
Regarding the effect of age, from Chart 2 it is visible that the consumption of health care is very high in
thefirst yearsoflifeanddecreasesuntil30- 40yearsold,morefor menthanfor women,andthereafter
it increases for men while remaining fairly constant for women. These results seem intuitive: the initial
decreasing path may be related to the fact that children often require more health care (having there-
fore periodicdoctorappointments); andafter somepointinthe lifecycleit is expectedanincreasingre-
course to health services if age is understood as an indicator of the depreciation rate of health
(Grossman (1972)). Most studies on health care demand consider that age has a quadratic relation-
ship with health care utilization (Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Winkelmann (2006) and Lourenço
(2007)). This option was tried but both coefficients did not appear significant and, when checked, a
third order polynomialalloweda much better fit to the data. Additionally, ageing and gender effects are
modelled together. Note that in our specification, it makes little sense to interpret the dummy female
alone. The advantages of assessing the ageing effect by gender typeare clear from Chart 2: men tend
to consume less while women’s behaviour towards health demand is smoother over the life cycle. By
comparing the effects on the median with the 8th decile of y*, it can be observed that the pattern of the
effects is similar but as a whole the impact of age is less pronounced in explaining high levels of visits
to a doctor. This is verymuch in line withthe results of Winkelmann(2006) whoshowsthat in the upper
tail of the distribution of the number of visits age has a minor effect.
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3being  x equal ~ x except for age that is set equal 0.The level of income has a positive but negligible effect on health care utilisation, constant across the
different quantiles. Conceptually, it is possible to find at least two channels for income influence. The
first derivesfrom the Grossman’s model(1972),inwhichincomesets the budgetconstraintand,there-
fore, the ability to pay for health care. The second channel is related to the fact that different levels of
incomecan explaindifferencesin the opportunitycost of beingill and in the cost of visitinga doctor, es-
pecially if we closely relate income with the wage rate. In Portugal, the first channel may not actually
exist as a consequence of the design of health care systems. This is broadlyapplicable to both private
and public subsystems and to NHS beneficiaries, although the latter to a minor extent. Direct costs of
beneficiaries are relatively small as most of the cost of a consultation with a doctor is borne by the
health care system, whichis financed predominantlyby general taxation or employers and employees
compulsory contributions. In this context, the second channel may be more relevant and it is consis-
tent with the estimated small effect of income over all the outcome distribution. Also the educational
level has a small positive impact on health care utilisationthat does not changesignificantlyacross the
estimated quantiles. The previous empirical evidence of Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995), Winkelmann
(2006) and Lourenço (2007) also found small positive effects for both income and education influ-
ences. Concerning the effect of marital status, the results point out that single people visit doctors less
often. These findings may indicate that they are less risk-averse regarding their health. As to the occu-
pational status, the estimated semi-elasticities are positive for retired individuals and negative for stu-
dents, meaning that the utilisation of health care increases over the life cycle, being lower when we
study, higher when we work and much higher when we retire. In the interpretation of the results it is
important to be aware that these particular variables may capture to some extent Grossman’s income
and age effects.
Finally, the coefficients related with area of residence indicate that individuals from the Centro region
seek for more doctors’ consultations, followed by the Norte and Lisboa. Individuals from the autono-
mous regions consume much less health care services than those from the mainland. Regarding esti-
mated effects in the different quantiles, it can be concluded that they are more or less constant in most
cases and growing in the case of Norte and Lisboa. The seasonal variables indicate that individuals
consume fewer visits to doctors in summer while in autumn doctor’s consultations reach a peak.
6. FURTHER RESULTS: CUMULATIVE HEALTH EFFECTS
OF DOUBLE COVERAGE
As mentioned in Section 3.1, some individuals may have enjoyed health insurance double coverage
foralongperiodoftimewhichmaygeneratecumulativehealthbenefits from abettermedicalfollow-up
over time (Barros et al. (2008)). If this occurs, the difference in the number of doctor visits betweenthe
two groups should decrease with age. The idea is that the recent beneficiaries of a health subsystem
(more likely the younger generations) did not have time to accumulate such health benefits, whereas
the older beneficiaries (more likely the older generations) had time to do so, and that will make them
relatively healthier when compared with individuals who only have access to the NHS. If this outcome
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Given this situation, it is interesting to study the empirical specification previously presented for differ-
ent age groups: a subsample of individuals with more than eighteen years old (28,736 observations)
and a second subsample of individuals with age between eighteen and forty five (12,637 observa-
tions). Chart 3 presents a comparison of the estimated double coverage coefficients focusing on the
upper tail results. The most important fact is that the effects of both public and private subsystems are
higherfor the youngergenerationsandthis occurs over the wholedistribution.When the analysisis re-
stricted to individuals with more than eighteen years old, both   1 and   2 become slightly lower
vis-à-vis the previous estimates, whereas the younger cohort (the one with individuals with more than
eighteen and less than forty five) has the largest estimated effects. The differences are very expres-
sive, especially for public employees. This is consistent with Barros et al. (2008) findings. For different
levelsof visits to thedoctor, beneficiariesfrom privatesubsystemsandpublicsubsystemsbehavenow
in a quite different way. Regarding the public subsystems, quantile regression results show that the
supplementary insurance effect of the younger cohort decreases considerably across the distribution,
whichindicate that the double coverage is relativelyloweramong younghigh users. Also note that this
was not the case for the full sample and that the coefficients of the different age groups are similar in
the 9th decile. For the private subsystem, the estimated impact of the younger group increases until
the 7th decile and decreases thereafter. This path is similar to that obtained for the full sample. The re-
sults seem to confirm the possibility that the estimated impacts for the elder groups are lower, may be
reflecting accumulated health benefits from the existence of the subsystems.
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(14) The changein the populationunderanalysisandthe reductionof the sample(in particularof the numberof individualswith subsystems) should,however,
be taken into account.7. CONCLUSIONS
This article examines the impact of additional coverage on the utilisation of visits to the doctors at dif-
ferent levels of the outcome distribution, contributing to the empirical literature on health insurance.
More particularly, it presents evidence for Portugal as it is about differences in the utilisation behaviour
between individuals only covered by the NHS and individuals covered by additional health subsys-
tems. The approach consisted in studying differences in the number of doctor consultations between
NHS and public and private subsystems, using a recent quantile regression estimator for count data.
As such, the analysis overcomes the limitations of traditional parametric count data models by investi-
gating the effect of covariates on the shape of the distribution, without imposing restrictive assump-
tions. The selection bias is minimized by using only individuals who benefit from health insurance
double coverage on a mandatory basis and by analysing its impact on different age cohorts.
The results show that the additional coverage is important in explaining the consumption for doctor
consultations. That is, supplementary insurance leads to a relatively higher increase in utilisation (vis-
its to a doctor) for regular (less evident among heavy) users of the health system. When the effects of
publicandofprivatehealthinsuranceplansarecompared,itisclearthatthedoublecoverageresulting
from private schemes health has a much higher impact than that stemming from the health insurance
plan of public employees. Another important finding is that the relative effect of both sources of double
coverage is almost constant across quantiles, which means that they display a similar path along the
distribution. The analysis for the youngest cohort shows that the estimated effects of both public and
private health insurance on top of the NHS are higher than the ones for the full sample, possibly
reflecting accumulated health benefits.
To explain the differences in the utilisation of doctor consultations between the different health insur-
ance status, several demographic, socioeconomic and health status variables, besides the geo-
graphic and seasonal effects werecontrolled for. Not surprisingly, results indicate that the existence of
chronic diseases or pain is extremely relevant in explaining doctor visits, especially for high users.
Among the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, age assumes a unique role, especially
whencombinedwithgender. Inthefirst yearsoflivingtheconsumptionofhealthcareisveryhighandit
decreases until 30-40 yearsold, more for men than for women,and thereafter it increases for men and
remains fairlyconstant for women.Education and income present significant positive effects (constant
over the whole distribution), although less important than those of other regressors. Results from
quantile regression are similar to those from previous literature in terms of the significance of key
covariates, but the combination of age and gender is novel in the literature.
In short, health insurance double coverage creates additional utilisation of health care. This additional
consumption effect is probably only slightly higher for medium-intensity users than for heavy users.
Also interesting is the large difference in impact according to the type of health insurance double cov-
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vate organizations than when obtained from government financed entities.
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